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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
'It is a Question of Power"*
Michael Jenkins" and Paul Hribernick***
"Doctrinal dissarray"' has characterized adjudications of state
taxes imposed upon interstate commerce. The disarray came to a
happy end with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady's' imposing a
test of functional economic realism on Commerce Clause cases.' The
approach in Complete Auto was recently consolidated in Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.' These cases, plus a handful of
recent related cases,' demonstrate a quiet revolution in Commerce
Clause decisions, a revolution that finally holds a promise of predict-
ability and consistent doctrine in Commerce Clause interpretation.
SOURCES OF DOCTRINAL DISARRAY
As regards both state regulation and state taxation of interstate
commerce, the seeming inconsistency among the cases and the lack
of analytical thread that connects them can be traced to a primary
conflict that the founding fathers faced in drafting the Constitution:
"The centrifugal, isolating or hostile forces of localism"' versus the
"centralizing forces of nationhood and union."' The Commerce
* The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
* JD., Southern Illinois University; Instructor, Louisiana State University.
J.D., University of Oregon; Research Associate, Sea Grant Legal Program,
Louisiana State University.
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part of the National Sea Grant Program maintained by the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration. United States Department of Commerce. The federal
government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental pur-
poses.
1. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-13 (1978).
2. 430 U.S. 274 11977).
3. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 6-14.
4. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
5. See text accompanying notes 106-54, infra.
6. Browde & DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the
Commerce Clause: Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 OR. L. REV. 7 (1981); Hellerstein.
State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426 (1977); Hellerstein, State Taxation in the
Federal System: Perspectives on Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas, 55 TUL.
L. REV. 601 (1981).
7. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the
Judiciary, 67 YALE L. J. 219, 220 (1957).
8. L. TRIBE. supra note 1, at § 6-1.
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Clause' did not of itself provide a solution, but in unmistakable
language"0 permitted Congress to so provide. The Commerce Clause
did not, by its terms, disable states from regulating commerce ex-
cept to the extent that doing so either conflicted with Congress' ex-
ercise of its grant" or else conflicted with explicit related constitu-
tional limitations on state power."
The limitation on state interference with interstate commerce
derived not the from the Constitution's own words but instead from
its negative implications,"8 characterized as "these great silences of
the Constitution."" The federalism/localism conflict most often ex-
pressed itself in cases involving regulations that arguably impinged
on interstate commerce.' State taxes attacked as violating the Com-
merce Clause were either upheld or struck down on other constitu-
tional grounds" until Case of the State Freight Tax' was decided in
1872. Since Congress has only recently spoken in the area of state
taxation affecting interstate commerce, 8 the federalism/localism
debate has continued to rage. As no doctrinal approach emerged vic-
torious, widely divergent opinions have been the norm, rather than
the exception;m " and the individual justices have adjusted doctrine to
accommodate judicial experience."
In the slow evolution of Commerce Clause analysis over the last
150 years, two basic analytical frameworks have dominated Commerce
Clause thinking. In 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden,' Chief Justice John
9. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
10. The Congress shall have Power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 2 & 3.
13. See Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L.
REV. 556 (1936). See also L. TRIBE, Supra note 1, at § 6-2.
14. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (Jackson, J.).
15. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299 (1851); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). See also F.
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL. TANEY AND WAITE 37 (1937).
16. J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 163-64 & nn. 4 & 6 (1969).
17. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1970).
19. Compare Saint Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 369
(1923) with Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) with Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951). See generally J. HELLERSTEIN. supra note 16, at 165-74.
20. Compare McCarrol v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) with McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J.). See also Brown, supra note 7, at 221-22.
21. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Marshall announced his classic translation that the Commerce
Clause not only grants the Federal Congress power to control in-
terstate and foreign commerce, but simultaneously acts as a barrier
to state legislation in the same sphere.' The idea that the Com-
merce Clause has a mirror image that serves to limit the ability of
the various states to tax and regulate commerce has represented
the main stream of thought in the Court's subsequent and frequent
considerations of the Commerce Clause. In 1847, Marshall's suc-
cessor, Chief Justice Roger Taney, writing in a concurring opinion,u
thrust forward his view of Commerce Clause analysis which denied
the existence of the so-called "negative implication" 4 restraints on
state taxing authority." Taney's postulation, while having served as
a loyal opposition, has never garnered the necessary popularity to
become the majority view of the Court." However, it periodically
resurfaces with considerable strength throughout the history of
Commerce Clause cases, particularly when dogged application of the
Marshall view leads toward an absurd result."
THE MARSHALL THEOREM
Gibbons v. Ogden involved a grant by the New York legislature
of the exclusive right of steamboat navigation in the state to
22. See text accompanying notes 39-44, infra.
23. See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847) (Taney, C.J.).
24. See Sholley, supra note 13, at 556.
25. See text accompanying notes 45-67, infra.
26. While the outcome of the decisions in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504
(1847), and State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872), in-
dicates that the Taney analysis may have been applied, the opinions do not bear this
out. In the former case, the nebulous opinions of Justices McLean, Catron, Woodbury
and Grier all appear to classify the state alcohol restrictions not as regulations of com-
merce, but rather as legitimate acts of state police power sanctioned by Chief Justice
Marshall in Brown v. Maryland. Apparently unable to make up his mind, Justice
Nelson concurred with both Chief Justice Taney and Justice Catron. In the latter case,
Justice Strong unequivocally stated that the tax was not "directly" on interstate com-
merce, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 294. Rather, he concluded that the tax had been mixed
with "the general mass of the company's property." Id. at 295. He then referred to
Chief Justice Marshall's approval of state taxation of a company's general mass of
property in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). Cooley v. Board of
Wardens cannot be cited as a victory for the Taney position. Even though some of the
language of the case mirrors the Taney analysis, the overriding test in Cooley is
whether the activity is local or national in character. The effect of the case was to con-
tinue the process, tacitly approved in Brown v. Maryland, of defining exceptions to the
exclusive power of Congress over commerce on a case-by-case basis. This cannot be
reconciled with Taney's position that the states are free to act until Congress indicates
otherwise.
27. See Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (Black. J., dissenting).
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Messrs. Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton. Contrary to this ex-
clusive privilege, Gibbons operated two steamboats in New York
waters and Ogden (who had been assigned the privilege) sued for in-
junctive relief. Among other grounds, 8 Gibbons defended on the
theory that, because his boats were federally registered," the action
of the legislature of New York which denied him access to New
York waters was repugnant to federal power under the Commerce
Clause. This setting provided the Chief Justice with a perfect op-
portunity to address the relationship between federal and state
power as dictated by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution at
the very beginning of the industrial age.
While conceding that the "sole question""0 for review was
whether a "State [can] regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the States, while Congress is regulating it," Marshall felt
compelled to explain what he viewed as the basic premise of the
Commerce Clause in order to conclusively "demonstrate proposi-
tions which may have been thought axioms."'" First, Marshall ex-
pressed his opinion that, even though the general government was a
government of enumerated powers, the founders intended it to have
great enough power to overcome the limitations of the Articles of
Confederation, especially in the area of interstate commerce. Noting
that the "embarrassing and destructive"32 discrimination and retalia-
tion among the independent states was one of the principal reasons
for the failure of the Articles of Confederation," and stressing the
fundamental difference between the loosely-banded league under the
Articles and the union under the Constitution, Marshall emphasized
that the Constitution gave Congress the power "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper""4 to give effect to the docu-
ment and the new union. He argued that such an expansive grant of
general power to Congress would be inconsistent with a narrow con-
struction of the power of Congress over interstate and foreign com-
merce. Next, Marshall proceeded to examine the nature of the ac-
tivities which the founders intended to encompass when they refer-
28. Gibbons also argued that the grant violated the constitutional authorization to
Congress for the progress of science and the useful arts. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 40, 1 Stat. 305. This Act provided for the licensing of
ships engaged in the coastal trade and fisheries.
30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 200.
31. Id. at 221.
32. See argument of Mr. Webster, id. at 11.
33. See Sholley, supra note 13, at 559-60. See also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig; Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187 (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18).
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red to "Commerce." "Undoubtedly, [it] is traffic but it is something
more: it is intercourse."" Such commerce by all common understand-
ing must include "every species of commerical intercourse" '"3 in-
cluding navigation. 7 Furthermore, the power of Congress over com-
merce among the states cannot respect the jurisdictional lines of the
states, but must pass into the interior of the states or it is a "very
useless power."38 He concluded that Congress was clearly intended
to have power over a wide range of business activities, both inside
and outside of the states.
Finally, Marshall turned his inquiry to the nature of the com-
merce power. In response to the argument of counsel for the re-
spondent that, where it can be done without violating the plain let-
ter of the Constitution, it is highly important to find that all powers
of the federal government are held concurrently with the states,
Marshall echoed favorably the argument of the appellant in stating
that "full power to regulate a particular subject, implies the whole
power and leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is incom-
patible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it.""
He concluded that the power over commerce granted to the federal
government, "like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."
Gibbons v. Ogden received substantial reinforcement three
years later in Brown v. Maryland.'" This case involved a state
license tax imposed on importers who wished to sell their goods. In
striking down the tax as incompatible with the Commerce Clause,
Marshall dismissed the suggestion of counsel for Maryland" that to
void this law would impair the taxing power of the states. "We ad-
mit this power [of the states to tax] to be sacred; but cannot admit
that it may be used so as to obstruct the free course of the power
given to Congress. We cannot admit, that it may be used so as to
obstruct or defeat a power to regulate commerce."'" Under the Mar-
shall formulation, the grant of power over commerce to Congress
35. Id. at 189.
36. Id. at 193.
37. Id. at 190.
38. Id at 195.
39. Id. at 198. See the argument of Mr. Webster, id. at 13-14.
40. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
41. The case of Maryland was argued by Mr.-later Chief Justice-Roger Taney.
42. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 448.
19821
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was so complete that it superseded the taxing power which the Con-
stitution had unquestionably reserved to the states. 3
The result of the holdings in Gibbons v. Ogden and Brown v.
Maryland was to transform an undefined grant of power to Con-
gress into an exclusive power in Congress over interstate com-
merce. If pushed to its logical conclusion, the Marshall view of the
Commerce Clause grants power to the Supreme Court, at the ex-
pense of the several states, to limit state taxing and regulatory
authority over commerce when Congress has not already enacted
limits."
THE TANEY THEOREM
Opposed to the notion that the Constitution granted exclusive
power over interstate commerce to Congress and simultaneously
limited state taxing and regulatory authority by negative implica-
tion, Chief Justice Roger Taney offered an alternative explanation
of the Commerce Clause'5 in The License Cases." The three License
Cases involved similar attempts by Massachusetts," New Hamp-
shire,'" and Rhode Island" to discourage use of spirits by prohibiting
small sales to individuals" or by requiring sellers to obtain a
license." Among other defenses, each of the defendants claimed that
the statute under which he was prosecuted was void because it con-
flicted with the undivided power of Congress over interstate com-
merce granted by the Commerce Clause. In affirming the convic-
tions of all three defendants, the Court offered nine separate opin-
43. See Sholley, supra note 13, at 572-73. for a discussion of the implicit right of
the states to tax.
44. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 15, at 18.
45. the first manifestation of the Taney position involved state legislation con-
cerning the same steamboat monopoly ultimately ruled on in Gibbons v. Ogden. Chief
Justice Kent of the New York Court of Errors determined that the Fulton/Livingston
monopoly was not void against the exclusive power of Congress in Livingston v. Van
Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (1812). Later, Kent (now Chancellor) passed on the same question
in Ogden v. Gibbons. 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 150 (1819). The reasoning in these cases'coir-
responds closely with Taney's opinion in The License Cases. See generally Sholley.
supra note 13.
46. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
47. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, id. at 505.
48. Peirce v. New Hampshire, id. at 554.
49. Fletcher v. Rhode Island, id at 540.
50. The Massachusetts law proscribed a minimum sale of twenty-eight gallons.
Rhode Island prohibited any sale less than ten gallons. Id. at 505, 541.
51. Whereas Massachusetts and New Hampshire required the sellers to obtain a
license, Rhode Island did not. Id. at 505, 541, 554.
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ions, but the true rationale for the decision is found in Justice
Taney's well-reasoned opinion. Taney held that, in the absence of
congressional action, the states may exercise legislative power over
matters of foreign and interstate commerce unlimited by any
negative implications of the Commerce Clause.
Whereas Marshall began his inquiry by examining the constitu-
tional basis for federal power,52 Taney 'focused on the states' power
to act: "[Alre the States absolutely prohibited by the Constitution
from making any regulations of foreign commerce?"" Expressed dif-
ferently, the issue was "whether the grant of power to Congress is
of itself a prohibition to the States, and renders all State laws on
the subject null and void."" Taney concluded that a grant of power
to Congress, by its own force, does not negate state power by im-
plication. It is, he said,
very clear, that the mere grant of power to the general govern-
ment cannot, upon any just principles of construction, be con-
strued to be an absolute prohibition on the exercise of any
power over the same subject by the States .... and such regula-
tions [as may be passed by the states concerning safety, health,
citizenry, or port operation] are valid unless they come in con-
flict with a law of Congress."
Taney cites a Marshall opinion, Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co.," as an example of a state exercising its power in the absence of
congressional action. That case, decided after Gibbons v. Ogden,
held that a state, to protect the health of its citizens, could drain a
navigable waterway even though such action would prevent continu-
ing use of that waterway in foreign or interstate trade. Taney
framed the entire constitutional issue in Commerce Clause cases as
being one of presence or absence of power. If a state could act, it
was because the state possessed the power to act. Therefore, in
52. Marshall's analysis in Gibbons v. Ogden started with reference to the prob-
lems of the Articles of Confederation and what he viewed as the solution posed by the
framers o,' the Constitution: granting specific enumerated powers to Congress. Mar-
shall then framed the issue as a narrow reading versus an expansive reading of those
national powers. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187-89 (Marshall, C. J.).
53. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 583. Taney felt that the classification scheme sanctioned by
Marshall (see text accompanying notes 68-73, infra) ultimately reverts to an examina-
tion of the states' motives in passing legislation. Taney felt the only proper inquiry in
a Commerce Clause case was whether the state had the power to act.
54. Id. at 578.
55. Id. at 579.
56. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
19821
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Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., the Court could only approve the state
action if the state inherently possessed the power to act. It was of
no consequence that the state acted for the protection of its
citizenry. "[Tlhe object and motive of the State are of no importance,
and cannot influence the decision. It is a question of power.""8
To further emphasize that a bare grant of power to Congress
does not destroy state power to legislate on the same subject, Taney
pointed to two earlier decisions of the Marshall Court, Houston v.
Moore " and Sturges v. Crowninshield.15 In Houston, a Pennsylvania
law made any member of the state militia who refused to serve
when called upon to do so by the President of the United States sub-
ject to trial by a state court martial and liable for any penalties
prescribed by Congress. The defendant Houston argued that his
prosecution by the state under this law was of no event because the
law was void in the face of the constitutional grant to Congress to
"provide for the Calling forth of the Militia."'" The Marshall Court
quickly disposed of this argument, calling it "a branch of the exploded
doctrine that within the scope in which Congress may legislate, the
states shall not legislate.""2 In Crowninshield, the issue was whether
New York could constitutionally adopt a bankruptcy law in light of
the constitutional grant of power to Congress to establish "uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.""3
Even though it struck down the statute on other grounds," the
Court concluded, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, that states
can address the bankruptcy question provided that any laws enacted
57. Taney argued that if the grant of commerce power to Congress was indeed ex-
clusive, then the state had no power to enact any regulations, including the police
power regulations that Marshall alluded to in Gibbons v. Ogden and later sanctioned in
Brown v. Maryland and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. Taney argued that
Marshall's position (that the federal government had exclusive power but the state
could still act) was inherently contradictory. Either the states possessed the power or
they did not. Furthermore, if the Constitution prohibited power to the states as Mar-
shall claimed, Congress is powerless to give it back. Therefore, if the states can act, as
Marshall stated they can in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., they must in-
herently possess the power that Marshall would deny them in Gibbons v. Ogden. 46
U.S. (5 How.) at 583-84.
58. Id.
59. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
60. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 15.
62. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 45 (Johnson, J., concurring in result).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
64. The Court found the law to violate the prohibition against the impairment of
contracts. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 208. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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do not conflict with prior actions of Congress." Taney argued that
for Marshall to later declare, in Gibbons v. Ogden, that the com-
merce power is exclusively for Congress, was totally inconsistent
with the logic of the earlier well-reasoned opinions.
Because the Constitution does not strip the states of their in-
herent power, the keys to controlling state taxes and regulations of
commerce under the Taney view are, first, an active Congress mak-
ing regulations pertaining to commerce, and second, rigorous ap-
plication of the Supremacy Clause" to strike down state actions that
conflict with those of Congress. Taney argued that, if a grant of
power to Congress is of its own force sufficient to prohibit state ac-
tion, the Supremacy Clause is surplusage. Taney was unwilling to
charge the framers of the Constitution with such lax drafting."
The Taney view of the Commerce Clause as evidenced by the
holding of The License Cases is that Congress does not have ex-
clusive power over interstate commerce; rather, that power is con-
current with the several states until Congress-which concededly is
vested with supreme power-acts to curtail state power. Under this
reading of the Commerce Clause, if Congress fails to use its
supreme power, the power of the state is maximized while the
power of the Court to limit state taxation and regulation of com-
merce is minimized.
THE SUBJECT MATTER TEST
In the years following Brown v. Maryland," the Court perceived
that exclusive federal power over commerce necessarily conflicted
with the legitimate interest of the states to regulate the day-to-day
65. Marshall's argument in Crowninohield appears to be the perfect restatement
of Taney's position: "It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which
is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the States." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 196. However, in fairness to Marshall, it must be pointed out that he viewed the
bankruptcy provision of the Constitution as a special case. ld. at 193-94. But Marshall's
perception of the special nature of the bankruptcy provisions does not change the fact
that the Bankruptcy Clause purports to grant power to Congress in the same manner
as does the Commerce Clause. In fact, it is arguably a stronger grant of power than
the Commerce Clause because the provision specifically commands that bankruptcy
laws be uniform throughout the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The
Commerce Clause contains no such demand of uniformity, but Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden seems to require it by implication.
66. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
. 67. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 579-80.
68. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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affairs of its citizens and to raise revenue through taxation. The
decisions of. the Court began to reflect and respond to this realiza-
tion. In Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 9 even Chief Justice
Marshall recognized that not all state actions affecting commerce
are repugnant to the Constitution. In that case, Marshall concluded
that there was no conflict between the state action at issue and the
Commerce Clause because measures calculated to protect the health
of the citizenry do not conflict with the powers of the federal
government and therefore are "undoubtedly . . . reserved to the
States."0 Marshall's brief decision opened the door for the Court, in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens,' to rethink the exclusive nature of
federal power under the Commerce Clause and to begin a process of
defining a limited universe of state activities which by their nature
could brush against the commerce power and yet survive.
Cooley involved a Pennsylvania law which required ships in
state waters to take a local pilot or pay one-half of the pilot's fee in-
to a special fund if they chose not to employ a pilot. Conceding that
navigation is commerce and that regulation of pilots by a state is a
regulation of commerce, the Court jposed the question of whether
"the grant of the commercial power to Congress ... per se deprives
the States of all power to regulate pilots."7 The Court concluded
that the exclusive domain of Congress includes only those subjects
national in nature. Because the nature of the commerce power is
defined by the nature of the subject, it was necessary for the Court
to examine the subject matter of the tax or regulation enacted by
the state. If the subject matter of the state action is local in nature,
the state may act. If the subject is national in nature, the Commerce
Clause prohibits state action."
The importance of the Cooley decision was not so much that it
provided the national/local subject matter distinction, but rather
that it legitimized case-by-case examination of state taxes and
regulations to determine whether they violated the Commerce
Clause rather than assuming that violations existed.
69. 27 U.s. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
70. Id. at 250.
71. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
72. Id. at 318.
73. The Court determined that pilotage was essentially a local concern because of
the Act of August 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 54, which declared that regulation of pilots and har-
bors should conform to the regulations of the states. However, the Court was careful
to point out that Congress could not empower the states to take an action prohibited
to them by the Constitution. See note 57, supra. See also note 26, aupra.
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THE DIRECT/INDIRECT EFFECTS TEST
No longer constrained by the inflexible prohibition on state ac-
tions, the Court was free to pick and choose among the cases,
upholding state actions which it deemed local in nature"4 and strik-
ing down those it found to be national in nature." With the post-
Civil War surge in the importance of the national interest, the Court
increasingly narrowed the number of instances in which it would ap-
prove state taxes that touched interstate commerce. From an in-
nocuous start,"6 a new test appeared in the Court: if the state action
directly burdened commerce, it was void;" if the state action only in-
directly touched commerce, the tax or regulation was upheld." The
advent of the direct/indirect test provided ultimate flexibility"' and
the Court experimented with many of the concepts used in later
Commerce Clause cases, but their decisions were always based on
some interpretation of the direct or indirect effect of the state tax
on interstate commerce. The true significance of the direct/indirect
test was that it served to increase the power of the Court relative
to that of the states. Because the constitutionality of particular state
enactments depended on a case-by-case judgment call, the Court
held the balance of power between the taxing authority of state
legislatures and the federal interest of free-flowing commerce and,
to a limited extent, could control the direction and development of
interstate commerce.
THE COMMERCE PER SE TEST
While the direct/indirect test evolved, the Court designated
several activities which were so innately tied to commerce between
the states that any attempt to regulate or tax them would be
voided. These cases trace back to the reasoning in Welton v.
74. See, e.g., County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1880): State Tax on
Railway Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 713 (1865).
75. See, e.g., Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877); Case
of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1867).
76. See Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876), holding that an interstate carrier
can be liable under a state wrongful death act.
77. See, e.g., Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Smith v. Alabama, 124
U.S. 465 (1888); Wabash Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
78. See, e.g., Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922); United States
Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918); Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187
U.S. 419 (1903); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1884).
79. See Sholley, supra note 18, at 582.
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Missouri,"0 where the Court held that inaction by Congress was a
declaration that a particular area of commerce should be free and
untrammelled.8 ' Expanding on this idea, the Court concluded that
certain businesses were so completely interstate in nature that the
Commerce Clause prohibited any state action. Such businesses" in-
cluded traveling salesmen,83 steamship companies,' mail order com-
panies," foreign express companies," and stevedoring companies."
An interesting corollary to the commerce per se rule was the
Court's declaration that certain activities could never be in in-
terstate commerce and therefore were always subject to state taxa-
tion. Included in this category were taxes on the severance of
minerals"8 and taxes on goods whose transporation in interstate com-
merce had been interrupted.8 '
REASSESSING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Flexibility was both the beauty and the major drawback of the
direct/indirect test. The flexibility of the test allowed the Court to
completely change the direction of Commerce Clause cases in the
1930's and later helped facilitate a reassessment of the test itself.
The disadvantage of the direct/indirect test is that it did not lead to
consistent or well-reasoned results. The onset of the Great Depres-
sion caused states to search for new sources of revenue. In response
to adventurous state taxing initiatives, the Court slowly began to
enlarge the areas of commerce in which the states would be per-
mitted to tax. In enlarging the states' freedom to tax on .a case-by-
case basis, the Court simultaneously began to narrow its own power
of review. The first such case was Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue,' in which the court validated a New Mexico tax on the
privilege to publish newspapers. Applying the direct/indirect test,
80. 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
81. Id. at 282.
82. Not just certain businesses were favored with the commerce per se test. The
Court also prohibited any state restrictions on the privilege to carry on interstate
business. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (overruled
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).
83. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
84. See, e.g., Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
85. See, e.g., International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
86. See Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).
87. See Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
88. See, e.g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) (reasoning disap-
proved in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 2953 (1981)).
89. See, e.g., Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
90. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
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the Court found only a remote burden on interstate commerce and
concluded that "even interstate business must pay its way." 1
But a new permissiveness toward state taxation did not free the
Court from the "metaphysical reasoning""2 that had traditionally
plagued Commerce Clause analysis. Indeed, during this period the
Court used the direct/indirect test to announce several cases un-
paralleled in their abused logic and absurd reasoning. 3 During the
same time, Justice Rutledge forcefully argued for an overhaul of the
direct/indirect test. Concurring in Freeman v. Hewit," Rutledge
argued that it is not the directness of the tax that the Commerce
Clause is concerned with, but rather the consequences of the tax;
the discriminatory multiple burdens of state taxation were the evil
that the Commerce Clause was intended to address. Rutledge
reasoned that if a state had jurisdiction to tax and had taxed fairly
so that no multiple burdens were created, the tax was not repug-
nant to the Commerce Clause.
Echoing Rutledge, Justice Black's approach in Commerce Clause
cases paralleled his literalist approach in first amendment cases:
"The interests of interstate commerce will best be fostered, pre-
served and protected-in the absence of direct regulation by the
Congress-by leaving those engaged in it in the various States sub-
ject to the ordinary and non-discriminatory taxes of the States from
which they received governmental protection.""
Arrayed against this approach was Frankfurter's argument that
"[t/he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of
free trade among the several States,"" even if doing so put local
business at a competitive disadvantage with interstate commerce
because of the former's being obliged to carry the latter's burden of
state taxation. 7 The justification for this burden, according to
Frankfurter, was that "whatever disadvantages may accrue to the
separate States from making of the United States a free-trade ter-
91. Id. at 254 (citing Postal Telephone-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259
(1919)).
92. Chief Justice Marshall, writing in Gibbons v. Ogden, about the pitfalls of Com-
merce Clause analysis. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 222.
93. See, e.g., Cloverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipeline Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938).
94. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
95. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 333 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
96. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 332 U.S. at 330 (Frankfurter, J.).
97. Id at 334-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ritory are far outweighed by the advantages not only to the United
States as a Nation, but to the component States." 8
Thus the federalism/localism debate continued, each side adher-
ing to a definite policy argument that went far beyond the formula-
tions of Marshall and Taney. Until the mid-1970's, neither side of the
debate was able to muster sufficient support to establish predict-
ability in interstate commerce taxation cases. As the facts shifted
imperceptibly, so did the constitutional validity of the taxes. Even
though the Court increasingly, over Frankfurter's objections,"
viewed interstate commerce as having to "pay its own way,""' ef-
forts to reconcile this shift with the direct/indirect test led to ques-
tionable distinctions,' and constitutional adjudication by draftsman-
ship.10
2
After some false starts,"8 the composition of the Court finally
permitted a consensus based on economic reality."' This in turn has
permitted the development of clear doctrine in interstate commerce
taxation.' The remainder of this article deals with the Court's new
doctrine in Commerce Clause state taxation cases.
NEW DOCTRINE
In 1959, the Supreme Court handed down its celebrated North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota"' decision. That
98. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 473
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99. Id
100. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. at 254.
101. 358 U.S. at 463-64 (distinguishing Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340
U.S. 602 (1951)).
102. See note 19, supra.
103. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
104. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Standard Pressed Steel
Co. v. Department of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S. 560 (1975). See Hellerstein, supra
note 6.
105. Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437
U.S. 267 (1978); Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 275 (1977).
106. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). The case was celebrated, not just by the law review com-
ments it received, but by the furor that it caused in certain parts of the busine.,s
world, a furor that resulted in the passage of the Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-272, tit. I, § 101, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)). See Hellerstein,
State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court 1974 Term: Standard
Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REV. 149, 151-53 (1976).
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case ruled that a state constitutionally could impose a non-
discriminatory, fairly apportioned net income tax on a foreign cor-
poration doing exclusively interstate commerce in the state. The
significance of Northwestern Cement is that it validated a tax on
what was admittedly interstate commerce, thus signalling a shift
from the previously dominant Frankfurter view that any taxation of
trade in interstate commerce is per se invalid. The case went no
further, however, even though it did premise its decision on the fact
that the tax was not discriminatory, was properly apportioned, and
was connected to the corporation's activities in the state.' Despite
an obvious inconsistency, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor""
and earlier cases, which had relied on the direct/indirect effects test,
were simply distinguished rather than overruled.'
In 1964, a closely divided Court took the surprising step of
validating a state tax on the unapportioned gross receipts earned
within a state in General Motors Corp. v. Washington."' Gross
receipts taxes have attracted Supreme Court scrutiny because of
the difficulty in assessing the fairness of such a tax. Gross receipts
do not necessarily relate to the income or profitability of an in-
terstate corporation, but instead measure only in-state sales. If
there are limited in-state expenses, as with overhead and employee
salaries, then a tax based solely on in-state receipts may not bear
proportionally on expenses incurred by the corporation in making
those sales. An in-state corporation's taxes would necessarily reflect
its only real income, so it is probable that the foreign corporation
would bear a heavier tax burden.
While both of these decisions were surprising, each could be
dismissed as another of the routine aberrations in Commerce Clause
litigation. But in 1975 the Supreme Court, with Justice Douglas
writing, decided Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of
Revenue."' The Court validated the Washington state tax on the
gross sales receipts of an interstate manufacturer for goods sold to
an in-state manufacturer. The former's sole connection with the
state, besides the income it earned from its sales, consisted of one
107. 358 U.S. at 462 (citing Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealy, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)).
108. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). Spector went to the utmost effort to justify permitting its
decision to turn on the vagaries of language, rather than actual burden, in state tax
laws. The 6-3 decision would permit only those tax laws which taxed through "constitu-
tional channels." Id at 608.
109. 358 U.S. at 463-64.
110. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
111. 419 U.S. 560 11975).
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employee living in the state who consulted with the in-state busi-
ness. The petitioner corporation claimed a lack of sufficient contacts,
under both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, to
justify the imposition of the sales tax. With regard to the Due Pro-
cess claim, the Court said merely, "We think the question in the con-
text of the present case verges on the frivolous.""' In its Commerce
Clause "nexus" analysis, the Court distinguished Norton Co. v.
Department of Revenue,"8 which had indicated that an interstate
business with only an agent in-state, taxed only on orders mailed
directly, could not validly be taxed in the state in which the orders
were paid. The unanimous Standard Pressed Steel Court instead
relied on General Motors Corp. v. Washington,"' for a proposition
not part of the case's holding. There, a closely divided Court had
said that the taxpayer business would have to prove multiplicity of
tax burdens in order for the Court to invalidate a tax. Apportion-
ment of a tax by income would cure any problem of multiple
burdens. The sales receipts tax in Standard Pressed Steel, the
Court said, was "apportioned exactly to the activities taxed, all of
which were interstate." " ' The effect of this analysis was, first, to im-
ply that making the sale is itself a sufficient nexus to justify applica-
tion of the tax, and second, to eliminate consideration of whether
the tax was indirectly imposed on any out-of-state activities.
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,"I decided the same year as
Standard Pressed Steel,;upheld a tax on the "qualification" to do
business in Louisiana. In so doing, the Court continued moving away
from the concept of free trade and the distinction between direct
and indirect burdens. The business conducted in Louisiana by the
Delaware corporation consisted of operating and maintaining a
pipeline which ran across the state. No sales or interruptions in the
flow of natural gas were made in Louisiana. No portion of the cor-
poration's income was earned in Louisiana. Again, relying on the
closely-divided General Motors Corp. v. Washington case, the
Supreme Court said that the validity of the tax depended upon
whether the state was exerting a "constitutionally fair demand for
that aspect to which it bears a special relation .. .; in other words
.... 'whether the State has exerted its power in proper proportion
to [the taxpayer's] activities in the State.""'7 The Court then quoted
112. Id. at 562.
113. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
114. 377 U.S. 436. cited at 419 U.S. at 563.
115. 419 U.S. at 563.
116. 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
117. Id. at 109 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. at 440-41).
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a proposition that could be found in any number of cases, that the
validity of a tax rests upon "whether the state has given anything
for which it can ask return." The Court cited this proposition as the
"controlling test.""' The Court again relied on General Motors Corp.
v. Washington, rather than simply affirming the tax on the authori-
ty of the 1948 decision in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone."' Mem-
phis Natural Gas, while factually identical to Colonial Pipeline, was
an equivocal plurality decision, and was notable primarily for the
concurring discussion of Justice Rutledge." ° Rutledge would have
validated the tax in Memphis Natural Gas because it was connected
to the state so that the state had "jurisdiction to tax," was not
discriminatorily imposed on interstate business, and was fairly ap-
portioned."' Blackmun's concurrence in Colonial Pipeline would have
preferred to rely on Rutledge's three-part test and would have
discarded the weight of Spector," but the majority opinion still
refused to do more than distinguish Spector.
The decision in Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline
are not remarkable for their analyses, but rather for the direction
that they indicated the Court had taken. Standard Pressed Steel,
decided unanimously, relied on a five-to-four decision, and Colonial
Pipeline had but one dissent."' Both of the cases dealt with issues
that had sharply divided the Court in the past. Besides indicating
the Court's probable direction, the cases taken together demon-
strate that a state need discover only some kind of business
presence in order to demonstrate a "nexus" so as to possess "juris-
diction to tax."
Although not a Commerce Clause case, Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages"' served as a dramatic announcement that the Supreme
Court had taken an unmistakable direction in assessing the right of
states to tax commerce. In Michelin, the Supreme Court overturned
a century of cases dealing with a state's right to tax goods under
the Import-Export Clauses. 2' The Court expressly overturned Low
v. Austin,"2' announcing that it was returning to the origin of Low's
"original package" doctrine, to determine the grounds upon which
118. Id.
119. 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
120. Id at 96.
121. Id at 96-97.
122. 421 U.S. at 12-13.
123. 335 U.S. at 115-16 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
124. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
126. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
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Brown v. Maryland had been decided.'" By returning to Brown v.
Maryland, the Court ignored the usual question of whether the
foreign goods had retained their status as imports. The Court in-
stead looked to the question of whether the tax prevented the
federal government from "speaking with one voice" in the arena of
international commerce. The Michelin Court focused on whether the
ad valorem property tax was discriminatorily laid upon goods
because they were imports. The tax was held to be non-
discriminatory and to not impose a burden on foreign commerce.,"
In line with its emerging philosophy toward state taxation, in
1977 the Court finally overruled Spector in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady. " Complete Auto held that a Mississippi tax on the
"privilege of doing business" within the state levied on a business in
interstate commerce was valid. Blackmun's unanimous opinion al-
luded to the absurd results created by adherence to the direct/in-
direct effects test for Commerce Clause analysis. The Complete
Auto test for assessing the validity of a state's tax on interstate
commerce was explicit: first, whether the state has a sufficient
nexus with the business taxed; second, whether the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce; third, whether the tax is
fairly apportioned; and fourth, whether the tax is reasonably related
to services provided by the state.' The first three of these tests
had surfaced a number of times in the Supreme Court's decisions,
most notably in Justice Rutledge's Memphis Gas concurrence'.' and
more recently in Northwestern Cement."2 The significance of the
adoption of the test is that Spector was overruled and the direct/in-
direct effects test was discarded. By discarding the test which
sought to determine whether a tax was imposed directly on inter-
state commerce, the Court denied the distinction as a per se basis
for validating or invalidating a state tax.
The fourth prong of the Complete Auto test, that the tax be
reasonably related to services provided by the state, first appeared
127. See note 40, supra.
128. 423 U.S. at 285. In 1979, the Court used the "speaking with one voice"
criterion to determine that an ad valorem property tax imposed upon instrumentalities
of international commerce violated the Commerce Clause. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). The Court there applied the Complete Auto test,
see text accompanying notes 129-30, infra, but added the "one voice" test as well
because of the enhanced risk of multiple taxation and international disputes. Id. at 451.
129. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
130. Id. at 277-78.
131. See note 121, supra.
132. See notes 106-07, supra.
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in Glouster Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,"' but had not been a part of
any of the recent decisions. Under close scrutiny the fourth prong
of the test appears to be an amplification of the nexus requirement.
The relationship of the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto
test was addressed in National Geographic Society v. California
Board of Equalization."' That case addressed the validity of Califor-
nia's use tax on interstate retailers applied in lieu of its in-state
sales tax. The only physical contacts between the Society and the
state were two offices which solicited mail order magazine sales in
the state. The two offices were not related to the Society's income
that resulted from its retail sales of maps, atlases, globes, and books
in the state. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the Society's
continuous presence in California in the two offices provided the re-
quisite nexus since those two offices, without regard to the nature
of their activities, availed themselves of local services that justified
the imposition of the state taxes. Thus the nexus requirement
demands a more specific relationship than the generation of income
within the state to the interstate business; nexus instead demands
that the state somehow provide a service to the business, a service
which so far has been found to be present when there is at least one
employee in the state.' 5 By trying the nexus prong to a considera-
tion of how the state provides benefits to an interstate business so
as to justify its tax, the Court blurs the distinction between the first
and fourth prongs by enlarging the former to encompass the latter.
The following year, in Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Cos.,'" the Court underscored its analytical
shift by overruling Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission"" and a long line of earlier cases. These cases had said that
stevedoring is an inextricable part of interstate commerce, and thus
was not susceptible to state taxation. Association of Washington
Stevedoring discarded any per se rule of what is commerce. ' With
this decision, the Court finally ended its vacillation in selecting a
test to determine what is interstate commerce by refusing to con-
sider the question. In response to the charge that Association of
133. 114 U.S. 196 (1885). The test was mentioned as an argument, but was not
relied upon as part of the decision.
134. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
135. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560
(1975).
136. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
137. 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
138. 435 U.S. at 750-51.
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Washington Stevedoring effected a fundamental change in the law,
the Court said explicitly that Complete Auto has effected the
change. Flying in the face of any free trade notions, the Court said,
[t]he Commerce Clause does not state a prohibition, it merely
grants specific powers to Congress. The prohibitive effect of the
Clause on state legislation results from the Supremacy Clause
and the decisions of this Court. If Congress prefers less disrup-
tion of interstate commerce, it will act.1" '
Also in 1978, the Court addressed the meaning of the third prong
of the Complete Auto test, that taxes be fairly apportioned. In Moor-
man Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,1"' the Court validated a "single fac-
tor formula" for apportioning interstate commerce income for state
tax purposes. Iowa's apportionment, based on sales only, had been
contested as violating the apportionment requirement because
measurement by that factor alone was used only in Iowa, while all
forty-four other states that taxed such interstate commerce
employed a more sensitive formula that would account for the
business' real expenses. As Justice Powell noted in his dissent, the
logical effect of one state's using the single factor formula while
other states used a more accurate measure was that interstate
businesses selling in Iowa necessarily would have a total higher tax
payment than local businesses. Powell insisted that, while this is not
a due process violation because there was no showing that the ap-
portionment was "out of all appropriate proportion" to the business
transacted, the method of apportionment, however, does result in
discrimination against interstate commerce."' He would have bal-
anced the state's interest in taxing against the "constitutional
preference for an open economy," '  demonstrating that
Frankfurter's notion of a free economy had not died. The majority
nonetheless refused to consider whether the type of apportionment
resulted in discrimination. The majority stated,
The only conceivable constitutional basis for invalidating the
Iowa statute would be that the Commerce Clause prohibits any
overlap in the computation of taxable income by the state. If the
Constitution were read to mandate such precision in interstate
139. Id. at 749. The Court cited Cooley and Gibbons v. Ogden.
140. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
141. Id, at 287. The majority opinion refused to acknowledge that the apportion-
ment method arguably leads to a discriminatory tax burden. Instead, the Court implied
that the fair apportionment requirement is not met only when a petitioner can
establish "the essential factual predicate for a claim of duplicative taxation." Id. at 276.
142. Id. at 289.
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taxation, the consequences would extend far beyond this case
and would require extensive judicial lawmaking. "'
In essence, the Court said that the Supreme Court is not an ap-
propriate forum for deciding such issues, but that such issues should
be addressed by Congress.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,"' the Supreme
Court validated a corporate income tax levied on the substantial
dividend income of a corporation's subsidiaries and affiliates, most of
which were entirely foreign to the state. Vermont's tax was assessed
on Mobil's entire income apportioned by the percentage of its whole-
sale and retail sales in Vermont. In response to Mobil's question of
whether the tax could apply to income earned on activities that had
no connection with the taxing state, the Court said that the Due
Process Clause was not violated, since Mobil's marketing and sales
in Vermont constituted a sufficient nexus, and because Mobil had
failed to prove that its foreign sources of income were not business
activities related to its in-state income. The Court said that the
Commerce Clause likewise was not violated, because the tax bore a
relationship to the benefits conferred to Mobil by the taxing state.
Vermont's taxing interests were not overridden by any interest
possessed by New York, Mobil's state of domicile. Finally, the Court
said that Mobil failed to prove a multiplicity of tax burdens on its in-
terstate business.
The Court noted that "the linchpin of apportionability in the
field of state income taxation is the unitary business principle. '"
Thus, "dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates reflect income
derived from a functionally integrated enterprise.""' The Court
refused to accept a "single situs" argument that any tax obligation
on unconnected interstate income be allocated to the domicile of the
corporation. Tax allocation is not required, the Court said, merely
because the business income of a unitary business is derived from
several states. Citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney,"' the Court said,
The requisite "nexus" is supplied if the corporation avails itself
of the "substantial privilege of carrying on business within the
state," and "the fact that a tax is contingent upon events
brought to pass without a state does not destroy the nexus be-
143. ld. at 278.
144. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
145. Id. at 439.
146. Id. at 440.
147. 311 U.S. 435. 444 (1940).
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tween such a tax and transactions within a state for which the
tax is an exaction."
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue 149 followed Mobile Oil by
refusing to accept Exxon's argument that its three functional units,
which are essentially in competition with each other, should have
separate tax liability allocations. The Supreme Court instead cited,
as a sufficient basis to meet its fair apportionment requirement, "a
rational relationship between income attributed to the State and the
interstate values of the enterprise." 1 The effect, then, of Mobil Oil
and Exxon is to collapse the apportionability requirement into a
bare nexus requirement. Further, the Court again rejected the argu-
ment of a possible multiple burden by requiring the corporation to
show not merely the risk of, but the actual presence of, multiple tax-
ation.
Maryland v. Louisiana,' decided in 1981, addressed the second
prong of the Complete Auto test: the requirement that a tax not
discriminate against interstate commerce. Interestingly, Maryland v.
Lousiana could have been decided solely on the tax's violation of the
Supremacy Clause,' but the Court insisted on addressing how the
tax violated the Commerce Clause as well. The tax discriminated
against interstate commerce in favor of local gas producers, the
Court said, by setting up a system of tax credits and exclusions
whereby the intrastate users of the gas were not burdened by the
tax, while out-of-state consumers would bear the cost of the tax.
The Supreme Court refused Louisiana's argument that discrimina-
tion was justified as "compensation," stating that Louisiana had no
interest in being compensated for the severance ,of resources in
federal outer continental shelf lands. '"
The significance of Maryland v. Louisiana for Commerce Clause
analysis is that it demonstrated that there are limits of Supreme
Court deference to state taxation legislation. The clear trend in the
cases had been to permit broad state discretion in forcing interstate
commerce to "pay its own way," While apportionability and nexus
had collapsed into a minimum* contacts-type test, and while the
Court refused to mandate particular methods of apportionment even
148. 445 U.s. at 437.
149. 447 U.s. 207 (1980).
150. Id. at 219-20.
151. 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981).
152. Id. at 2130-32.
153. Id. at 2135.
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where the state method employed resulted in some discrimination of
interstate business, the case strongly implies that the Court will
refuse to validate a tax scheme which intentionally imposes a
discriminatory burden on out-of-state consumers.'
Also in 1981, the Supreme Court concluded its analysis of the
four-prong test with a study of the fourth prong in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana.158 That case validated Montana's tax imposed
on the contract sales price of coal severed from the land in Montana,
including coal taken from federal lands. The tax varied, but could
reach a rate as high as thirty percent of the sales price. Approxi-
mately ninety percent of the coal was shipped in interstate com-
merce. The Court first explicitly disapproved of Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co.,'58 which had indicated that goods not in the stream of
commerce were immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Court
then looked to Complete Auto's third prong, discrimination, and
fourth prong, reasonable relationship to services, to determine if the
tax violated the Commerce Clause. Even though ninety percent of
the coal left the state, since the tax was computed at the same rate
regardless of its destination, the Court said that it was not
discriminatorily levied.'57 The Court then finessed the "reasonably
related to services" prong of Complete Auto by stating merely that
the "measure" of the tax, rather that the tax itself, must be fairly
related to the services provided by the state. '" Justice Marshall's
opinion emphasized the word "measure," but failed to explain how
154. The discrimination the Court found to 6e present in Maryland v. Louisiana
seems, in principle, no more onerous than, for instance, a facially neutral apportion-
ment formula that has a discriminatory effect. See note 140, supra. The distinction be-
tween the cases, however, is twofold: First, the tax on sales of animal feed in Moorman
affected primarily the profitability of the interstate business, and the business was
able to pass along its tax costs to only a limited range of consumers. The Louisiana
first use tax imposed a direct burden on all out-of-state consumers regardless of
whether the business was situated in the state or out of it, and a large segment of the
nation's consumers were affected. The second distinction is that the Louisiana tax in-
tentionally affected the discrimination, even though the state legislature was able to
articulate plausible reasons for the discrimination. See Hellerstein, supra note 6. at
620-26. Increasingly, intent has become the touchstone for discrimination cases. Cf. City
of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584 (1981) (proof of racially discriminatory intent re-
quired under a thirteenth amendment claim); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.
Supp. 1104,"1109 (1981) (proof of intent is required for a sex discrimination claim under
Title IX), and. may also be applicable to discrimination claims under the Commerce
Clause.
155. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
156. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
157. 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
158. Id. at 2958.
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this word avoided requiring a factual demonstration of the relation-
ship between the tax income and the services provided by the state.
Instead, Marshall said simply that the proper measure is or must be
left to legislative determination. 89 Finally, the Court considered, and
rejected, arguments of whether the tax violated the Supremacy
Clause by being in conflict with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act or
certain conservation acts.6 0
Montana raises a few questions. The first is, while a thirty per-
cent tax rate may not violate the Commerce Clause, at what point
will the Court conclude that a tax rate which applies to goods going
to out-of-state consumers discriminates against interstate com-
merce? As suggested at oral argument, a 1000 percent tax might
provide enough out-of-state income to completely finance the cost of
state government, so that the residents would happily live with the
additional tax burden imposed on them. Would that result, if based
on a facially neutral statute, be discriminatory? Must intentionality
be present to invalidate a de facto discriminatory tax? Furthermore,
to what extent is a state entitled to be recompensed for its services?
While interstate commerce must pay its own way, does that include
the costs of environmental and aesthetic damages? And, of course,
how are these "externalities" to be quantified, so as to properly
assess the tax?""
Part of the answer to those questions, according to Montana, is
that the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test does not anticipate
a judicial determination of .the relationship of the tax and the
benefits generated by the tax. "The simple fact is that the ap-
propriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for
legislative, and not judicial, resolution.""' The determination may be
at a state legislative level or, if Congress finds a conflict with
federal interests, at the national legislative level.'68 Montana's sim-
ple requirement, that "the measure of the tax must be reasonably
related to the extent of the contact,"'" says in essence that the
reasonably-related prong of Complete Auto, like the fair apportion-
ment prong, collapses into the nexus test.'
159. Id. at 2959.
160. Id. at 2960-64.
161. See Browde & DuMars, supra note 6, at 45-49.
162. 101 S. Ct. at 2959.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2958.
165. See Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 611-20. Hellerstein notes a distinction be-
tween cases where states have imposed taxes "for specific state-provided facilities" as
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Nonetheless, White's concurrence and Blackmun's, Stevens', and
Powell's dissent reflect the Court's reluctance to accept a thirty per-
cent tax. Blackmun, the author of Complete Auto, argued that the
fourth prong is the basis upon which a court can invalidate an
onerous state tax. He would have permitted Commonwealth Edison
to proceed to trial on the issue of "reasonable relationship," because
this tax appears to do "what the Commerce Clause was meant to
end."' " Further, Blackmun demonstrated how peculiarly susceptible
to "tailoring" that a tax on natural resources can be and how this
tailoring can lead to discrimination. His dissent must surely pose the
issue of establishing the rational limits at which states may tax in-
terstate commerce even where Congress has not acted.
CONCLUSION
With Montana, the Court has completed its investigation of each
of the four prongs to the Complete Auto test. Rather than
underscoring or defining Complete Auto, the cases instead cast
doubt on the continuing vitality of the test. The Court's marked
tendency has been to collapse the four prongs into a discussion of
nexus and discrimination. That these are the primary elements of a
fourteenth amendment Due Process and Equal Protection inquiry
cannot be overlooked.
If indeed Complete Auto and the subsequent cases impose a Due
Process test on state taxation of interstate commerce, then the
Court has returned to the Taney theorem, that a state is precluded
opposed to general revenue taxes for "broad governmental purposes." Id. In the first
instance, it is possible to measure the value received, so that the courts may validly
attempt a comparison. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). In the latter instance, a court simply is not institu-
tionally prepared to measure society's costs and to apportion the payment of those
costs. Hellerstein quotes Judge Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court:
It is not clear whether or how the "fair relation to state services" can serve as
a test independent from nexus. There are occasional perfunctory references to
police and fire protection .... But ... jiun practical economic terms, when a state
provides the organized legal system and other social machinery for conducting
purchases, sales, or other economic activities in its market, it surely protects and
serves whatever interest of the taxpayer suffices to constitute his required
"nexus" for tax purposes.
Budget Rent-A-Car of Wash.-Ore., Inc. v. Multnomah County, 287 Or. 93, 597 P.2d
1232. 1239 n.6 (1979).
166. 101 S. Ct. at 2972 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), echoing Holmes' oft-quoted
phrase in Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 296 (1920). Blackmun's
carefully selected language in the Montana dissent indicates that some members of the
Court still maintain Chief Justice Marshall's and Justice Frankfurter's concern for free
trade federalism.
19821
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
from taxing interstate commerce only if Congress has acted. Com-
merce Clause analysis thus has become Supremacy Clause analysis
as modified by the fourteenth amendment."' If the Taney theorem
supported by the fourteenth amendment becomes settled Commerce
Clause analysis, then the Court will have finally returned to con-
stitutionally defensible roots, as well as to predictable doctrine. The
Burger Court, so often criticized for its lack of doctrinal consistency,
has apparently succeeded where its predecessors had failed in
sweeping away the inconsistencies of trying to balance-and then
justify-the competing interests of federalism.
SUMMARY
An analysis of the Commerce Clause must originate with the
conflicting interpretations offered by Chief Justices Marshall and
Taney. Marshall viewed the clause as an exclusive grant of power to
Congress, but sanctioned the judicial exception of certain classes of
activities from that exclusive sphere. Taney's view would have
minimized the importance of the judiciary by emphasizing the power
of Congress. According to his view, the states are not prohibited
from taxing and regulating interstate commerce unless Congress in-
tervenes.
With the decision in Cooley, the Court enthusiastically embraced
its power of exception as promulgated by Marshall. The Taney view
of limited judicial power was cast aside by an activist Court, and
was replaced by a flexible case-by-case approach in determining
whether state intrusions into the commercial area were either local
or national in character or had a direct or indirect effect on in-
terstate trade.
The dissents of Rutledge and Black, and later the decision in
Northwestern Cement, signaled dissatisfaction with the judicially im-
posed flexibility of Commerce Clause analysis. Finally, in Complete
Auto, the Court abandoned the madcap tradition of the direct/in-
direct effects test in favor of a four-pronged test of functional
economic realism.
The Complete Auto test held out the promise of order in the
Court's disposition of Commerce Clause cases. But in the five years
since its adoption, the Court has issued decisions which indicate a
further adjustment in the Court's Commerce Clause analysis.
167. Taney, of course, served on the Court prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.
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Moorman Manufacturing, Exxon, Mobil Oil, and Maryland v.
Louisiana all indicate strongly that the operative test of Commerce
Clause analysis -despite the formal existence of a four-pronged
test-is a combination of nexus and discrimination inquiry-essen-
tially a Due Process analysis. Additionally, the reluctance of the
Court in Montana to pursue the fourth prong of the Complete Auto
test, and to require a factual inquiry as suggested by the dissent, is
further evidence of the Court's direction in Commerce Clause
analysis.
Mindful of Professor Hellerstein's warning against generaliza-
tions in Commerce Clause cases,'" it nonetheless appears that the
Court may be returning to an analytic framework that approximates
the Supremacy Clause simplicity ardently propounded by Chief
Justice Taney. If the Court continues along its present path, its
substantive Commerce Clause inquiry will be limited to nexus and
discrimination issues."' If the state action passes this inspection, the
Court's remaining function will be to satisfy the Supremacy Clause
inquiry of whether Congress has acted in the field. If the Court's
analysis reaches this point, it finally will have embraced the Taney
proposition that Commerce Clause analysis is solely a question of
whether a state has the power to act.
168. Hellerstein, supra note 6, 75 MICH. L. REV. at 1427.
169. The authors leave open the inquiry of whether nexus and discrimination
issues are solely a due process inquiry, or whether the issues have an independent
meaning for Commerce Clause analysis. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.,
discussed at note 147, supra; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, discussed at note 140. supra.
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